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Brown v. GNC Corp.: The Fourth Circuit’s New
Standard for Literal Falsity

INTRODUCTION

What does it mean for an advertisement to be literally false? Does the advertisement
need to actually deceive the public or does the advertisement have to be literally false
on its face? Federal courts have consistently held that, under the Lanham Act,1 to
show that an advertisement is literally false, a plaintiff is not required to prove that
an advertisement actually deceived customers, or that it was likely to do so, if the
advertisement is literally or actually false.2 However, if it is not clear whether the
advertising statement is false, then the plaintiff must prove that it misled or deceived
consumers.3 The difference between literal falsity and misleading advertisements has
been articulated in various false advertising claims jurisprudence.4 Nonetheless, in
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1.
The Lanham Act is a federal statute that grants protection for trademark and unfair competition.
2.
See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. Ill. 1996) (“The general rule is that if a statement is literally
false, the court may grant relief without reference to the reaction of buyers or consumers of the product.); Am.
Home Prods. Corp v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d. Cir. N.Y. 1978) (“Deceptive advertising or
merchandising statements may be judged in various ways. If a statement is actually false, relief can be granted on
the court’s own findings without reference to the reaction of the buyer or consumer of the product…”); Groupe
SEB United States, Inc, v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 198 (3d. Cir. Pa. 2014) (stating that proving
literal falsity relieves the plaintiff of its burden to prove actual consumer deception.); PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co. 639 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that when an advertisement is literally false, a
violation of the Lanham Act may be established even with no evidence of consumer deception).
3.
See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., F.3d 218, 229 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999), Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed
Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153(2d
Cir. 2007), Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 113 (2d. Cir. 2010), Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc. 902 F.2d 222, 228 (3d. Cir. 1990), Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co., 288
F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2000), Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 276 (4th Cir. 2002).
4.
See, e.g., Design Res., Inc v. Leather Indus. Of Am., 789 F.3d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 2015), Innovation
Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E. Inc., 694, F.3d 723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012), Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d
975, 977 (2d. Cir. 1988), Time Warner, 497. F.3d at 153, Scotts Co., 315 F.3d at 276,
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regards to literal falsity claims, courts have chosen to apply various tests depending
on the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.5
On June 2015, the Fourth Circuit heard Brown v. GNC Corp. (In re GNC
CORPORATION: Triflex Products Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation (No. II )),6
a class action lawsuit brought by purchasers of joint health supplements against the
manufacturer, GNC Corporation (GNC). The plaintiffs alleged that GNC violated
state consumer laws by misrepresenting the effectiveness of the supplements.7 In
response to the suit, GNC filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.8 The court incorrectly found that in order to survive
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff in a false advertising suit must allege that all reasonable
experts in the field agree that the representations are false.9 This ruling unfairly
heightened the literal falsity standard of a false advertising claim and diverged from
the literal falsity standard followed by its sister circuits; the third, fifth, and ninth
circuits have found that the literal falsity standard does not require everyone in a a
particular field to agree.10 The Fourth Circuit wrongly decided this case and should
have let a jury decide which experts to believe based on the evidence presented.11
This Note argues that literal falsity should not be determined by an allegation that
all scientists or experts agree on a particular predisposition at the pleading stage, but
rather should be determined at a later stage where both parties are able to present
evidence supporting or rebutting the issue at hand. Part I and Part II summarize
Brown v. GNC Corp. and give a brief historical background of the Lanham Act and
the literal falsity standard.12 Part III explains the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. Part IV
analyzes how GNC Corp. changed the literal falsity standard in the Fourth Circuit and
discusses how this new standard unfairly heightens a plaintiff’s burden in pleading
literal falsity.13 Finally, Part V concludes that the Fourth Circuit overreached in its
ruling and arguably created a strong pro-defendant precedent.14

5.
The various tests that courts have applied depends on whether the challenged advertisement is based on
test results. See Castrol Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d. Cir. 1992) (“A plaintiff’s burden in proving
literal falsity thus varies depending on the nature of the challenged advertisement. Where the defendant’s
advertisement claims that its product is superior, plaintiff must affirmatively prove defendant’s product equal or
inferior. Where … defendant’s ad explicitly or implicitly represents that tests or studies prove its product superior,
plaintiff establishes its burden by showing that the tests did not establish the proposition for which they were
cited.).
6.
789 F. 3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
7.
Id. at 506.
8.
Id. at 515.
9.
See infra Parts III, IV.
10.
See infra Part IV.
11.
See infra Part IV.
12.
See infra Parts I, II.
13.
See infra Parts III, IV.
14.
See infra Part V.
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I. THE CASE

A. Background
General Nutrition Corporation and GNC Holdings (hereinafter, “GNC”)
manufacture, market, distribute, and sell joint health dietary supplements under the
names “TriFlex: GNC TriFlex; GNC TriFlex Fast–Acting; GNC TriFlex Sport; and
GNC TriFlex Complete Vitapak.”15 These supplements all contain glucosamine
hydrochloride and chondroitin sulfate (“glucosamine and chondroitin”).16 They also
all contain the ingredients methylsulfonyl-methane (MSM) and hyaluronic acid
(HA). TriFlex Fast–Acting and TriFlex Sport also contain herbs like white willow bark
extract, hops cones extract, and Chinese skullcap root extract.17 Additionally, TriFlex
Complete Vitapak contains tablets of TriFlex Fast–Acting as well as separate fish oil,
willow bark, and MSM supplements.18
TriFlex product labels state that the supplements “promote[ ] joint mobility &
flexibility,”19 “protect[ ] joints from wear and tear of exercise,”20 “rebuild[ ] cartilage
and lubricate[ ] joints,” and provide “[m]aximum strength joint comfort.”21 The
labels also state that TriFlex Fast–Acting provides a 20% improvement in joint
function and 25–30% improvement in joint flexibility.22
Rite Aid Corporation (hereinafter, “Rite Aid”) also markets, distributes, and sells
store brand supplements including: Rite Aid Glucosamine/Chondroitin; Rite Aid
Natural Glucosamine /Chondroitin; Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin Advanced
Complex; Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin, Triple Strength + MSM; Rite Aid
Glucosamine Chondroitin + MSM; and Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin
Advanced Complex with HA.23 These supplements are manufactured by GNC, which
is contractually obligated to indemnify Rite Aid for any claims.24 Similar to the GNC
brand supplements, the Rite Aid supplements contain glucosamine, chondroitin, and
the same or similar herbs.25 Moreover, the Rite Aid labels also state that they
“promote[ ] joint health” or that they “help[ ] rebuild cartilage and lubricate joints.”26

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Brown, 789 F.3d at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 789 F.3d at 509.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Litigation
In Brown v. GNC Corp., consumers purchased various GNC and Rite Aid joint health
dietary supplements in different states.27 The named plaintiff-consumers alleged that
the supplements do not provide the health benefits stated on the labels and that they
would not have purchased the supplements but for the advertisement on the labels.28
The plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against GNC and Rite Aid under the
consumer protection laws of their states including various false and deceptive
business practices claims.29
The plaintiffs alleged that the advertisements on the labels of the supplements were
false because many scientific studies indicate that glucosamine and chondroitin do
not provide the promised health benefits.30 The plaintiffs cited to peer-reviewed
published studies that show that “glucosamine and chondroitin[ ] are ineffective at
treating the symptoms of osteoarthritis, whether taken alone or in combination with
each other,”31 and that “glucosamine, chondroitin, or both are no more effective than
a placebo in relieving the symptoms of arthritis.”32 The plaintiffs also cited studies
that showed that MSM was no more effective than a placebo in relieving the
symptoms of knee arthritis.33 Nonetheless, Rite Aid and GNC moved to dismiss the
claim stating that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the advertisements were literally
false.34
The District Court for the District of Maryland granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss (initial order), holding that the plaintiffs did not plead that “any reasonable
expert would conclude from the cited studies that glucosamine and chondroitin are
ineffective in non-arthritic consumers.”35 Additionally, the Court found that a
manufacturer could not be liable for false advertising as long as at least one qualified

27.

Brown, 789 F.3d at 510.
Id.
29.
Id. Plaintiffs filed suit under California’s Unfair Competition Law (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200
(West 2006)) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CAL CIV. CODE § 1750) (West 2006)) and Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, (815 ILCS 505/1). Id. at 511. Plaintiffs also filed suit under the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, (FLA. STAT. § 501.201), Ohio breach of express warranty under Ohio’s
UCC, (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26 9 (West 2006)), New York’s deceptive business practices statute, (N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (West, 2006)), and false advertising statute, (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350 (West 2006)), New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(West 2006)) and finally Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-1(West 2006)).
30.
GNC Corp., 789 F.3d at 510.
31.
Id.at 510.
32.
Id. at 511.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
28.
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expert opines that the representations are truthful, even if the overwhelming weight
of scientific evidence is to the contrary.”36
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ leave to re-file if they could plead that
“any reasonable expert would conclude from the cited studies that glucosamine and
chondroitin do not improve joint health in non-arthritic consumers;” however, the
plaintiffs did not amend their complaint.37 After the plaintiffs filed an appeal, they
moved for reconsideration.38 In denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
(later order), the court reasoned that it would be unfair for lay juries to ban the sale
of glucosamine and chondroitin because the evidence of their effectiveness is
inconclusive.39 Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s orders and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted certiorari.40 The Fourth
Circuit ruled that it could not reconsider the later order due to lack of appellate
jurisdiction, but it reconsidered the initial order to determine if the plaintiffs satisfied
minimal pleading burden for various state consumer false advertising claims and
affirmed the lower court’s order.41
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is a critical provision in regards to unfair
competition and trade laws. First, this section lays the framework and provisions of
Section 43.42 Second, this section explains the elements of a false advertising claim as
well as the difference between a literally false advertisement and a misleading
advertisement.43 Finally, this section examines how to prove each of these false
advertising claims.44
A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, which Congress enacted in 1946, establishes federal trademark law
and governs claims for false advertising.45 Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act
specifically protects consumers against false advertising.46 Under this provision, a
claim can be made against any person who, in connection with any goods used in
commerce, makes any false or misleading representation of fact which in commercial
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Brown, 789 F.3d at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
The Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (2012).
Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
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advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin” of “goods, services, or commercial activities.”47 A plaintiff may
bring a claim for false advertising if he or she shows the following: 1) the defendant
made false statements of fact about defendant’s own product or another’s product;
2) the advertisements actually deceived, or have the tendency to deceive, a substantial
segment of their audience; 3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence
the purchasing decision of consumers 4) the defendant caused its falsely advertised
goods or the advertisement itself to enter interstate commerce; and 5) the plaintiff
has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the foregoing either by direct diversion
of sales from itself to defendant, or by lessening of the goodwill which its products
enjoy with the buying public.48
B. Literally False v. Misleading Advertisements
The first element in proving a false advertising claim is showing that the defendant
made a false statement about the defendant’s or another’s product.49 Whether a
statement is literally false or misleading is a question of fact.50 To demonstrate a false
statement, the plaintiff has to show that the advertising statement was either: 1)
literally false, or 2) although literally true, the statement is likely to mislead, confuse,
or deceive consumers.51 For a statement to be literally false, the statement must be a
lie.52 Further, when a statement is literally false, the plaintiff does not need to provide
extrinsic evidence of consumer deception because the court will presume deception.53
When a statement is true but implies a falsehood, a plaintiff must provide extrinsic
evidence to show that customers were either deceived or were likely to be deceived.54
Courts have differentiated between literally false and misleading statements. The
Seventh Circuit stated that where the statement in question is “actually false, then the
plaintiff need not show that the statement either actually deceived consumers or was
likely to do so. But where the statement is literally true or ambiguous, then the
plaintiff is obliged to prove that the statement is ‘misleading in context, as
demonstrated by actual consumer confusion.”55 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
described a literally false statement as focusing on the plain language while describing

47.

Id.
Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2002).
49.
Id.
50.
See C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 1997).
51.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
52.
SmithKline, 131 F.3d at 434.
53.
United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d at 273.
54.
Id.
55.
B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 971–72 (7th Cir. 1999). See, e.g., Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988).
48.
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a misleading statement as focusing on how the advertisement is perceived by its
intended audience.56
1. Battle of the Experts in Proving Falsity or Deception in A False Advertising Claim
A trier of fact must determine whether an advertisement is literally false or
misleading; thus, both the plaintiff and defendants must present evidence to prove
that the advertisement is or is not false.57 One way that parties seek to prove that an
advertisement is not false is through expert testimony.58 This often results in
competing testimony either affirming that the advertisement is false or that it is not
false.59 For example, in Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc.,60 the plaintiff’s experts
testified about studies and tests that showed the plaintiff’s product had no estrogenic
activity and that it was not harmful.61 In contrast, the defendant’s experts presented
testimony that supported the advertisement and cited to studies stating that there
were harmful chemicals in the plaintiff’s products.62 The jury weighed the evidence
of both experts and found for the plaintiffs, holding that the advertisement was not
only literally false, but also misleading.63 Additionally, in PBM, the court allowed the
plaintiff’s expert testimony to be admitted into evidence even when the defendant
argued about the methodology of the customer survey being used.64 The court stated
that doubts as to the expert testimony’s methodology are properly addressed by the
trier of fact and not by the court.65 Thus, the use of expert testimony in false
advertising claims serves as an important function because “[t]he ultimate success of
an implied falsity claim almost always turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer
survey or scientific study.”66
56.
Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012); see also, C.B. Fleet Co. v.
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir. 1997).
57.
Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Lab., 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000).
58.
See PBM, 639 F.3d at 123. The Fourth Circuit has explained that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702
governs with expert testimonies in false advertising claims. Id.
59.
See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 2014).
60.
Id. In this case, the plaintiff, Eastman Chem. Co., manufactured a plastic resin called Tritan and sold it
to manufacturers of waterbottles and other plasticware. Id. at 233. The defendant, PlastiPure published an article
stating that Eastman products had dangerous levels of estrogenic activity and Eastman filed suit under the
Lanham Act for false advertising. Id. at 233.
61.
Id. at 238.
62.
Id. at 238–39.
63.
Id. at 239.
64.
PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co. 639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011).
65.
Id. See also, Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding
that survey’s technical unreliability goes to weight not admissibility).
66.
Harold P. Weingerger et.al, Lanham Act False Advertising: The Expert is Key, N.Y.L.J. (July 19, 2010).
Since Lanham Act surveys are specially designed for litigation, conducted and executed according to rigorous and
idiosyncratic rules, it is important that plaintiffs hire an expert to create and administer such a survey and to
testify at trial concerning the survey. Id.
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2. Proving Literal Falsity
Literal falsity is often difficult for a plaintiff to prove because the statement must be
unambiguously false.67 Additionally, “[t]he greater the degree to which a message
relies upon the viewer or consumer to integrate its components and draw the
apparent conclusion … the less likely it is that a finding of literal falsity will be
supported.”68 Thus, for a court to determine whether a claim is literally false, it must
first look to see if the claims are unambiguous and determine whether the claims are
false.69 This sub-section will examine the various subsets of literal falsity claims: false
by necessary implication, establishment, and non-establishment or independent
claims.70
a. False by Necessary Implication Claim
A literally false statement can either be facially false when it is directly stated or it can
be facially false by necessary implication.71 An advertisement that is false by necessary
implication is when, even though advertisement may not make a direct statement,
the advertisement is considered in its entirety, the audience would recognize the
statement as being explicitly stated; moreover, the indirect statement must relay an
unambiguously false message.72
There are various examples of false by necessary implication cases. For instance, a
court found that an advertisement was literally false when it claimed a specific brand
of motor oil provided “longer engine life and better engine protection,”73 without
directly mentioning competitors because it drew a comparison by necessary
implication.74 Also, the Second Circuit analyzed a false by necessary implication case
with Time Warner Cable Company.75 The court looked at Time Warner’s
advertisement, which made a statement that “[s]ettling for cable would be illogical”76
in the context of picture clarity between the plaintiff’s cable television services and
Time Warner’s television services.77 The court upheld the district court’s finding of
literal falsity by necessary implication because the claim necessarily implied that the
picture quality of the defendant’s DirecTV HD was superior to the plaintiff’s cable
67.

Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2002).
Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2014).
69.
Id. at 199.
70.
See infra Part II.
71.
PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co. 639 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2011).
72.
Id.
73.
Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1993).
74.
Id. at 946.
75.
See generally Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007)
76.
Id. at 158.
77.
Id. The court explained that that the preceding content included praise for the “amazing picture clarity
of DIRECTV HD.” Id.
68.
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television, when in fact it was not.78 The Fourth Circuit has also reviewed the false by
necessary implication doctrine in Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Indus. of Am.79 The
plaintiff argued that the defendant’s claim that “some upholstery suppliers are using
leather scraps that are misrepresented as leather”80 was literally false by necessary
implication because the phrase “some upholstery suppliers” referred to the plaintiff’s
products.81 However, the court found that a claim of literal falsity by necessary
implication was viable only where the plaintiff’s asserted conclusion “necessarily
flowed from the ad’s statements,”82 which was not present in this case.83
b. Establishment Claims
An establishment claim involves advertisements that explicitly or implicitly represent
that tests or studies prove the claim.84 To prove an establishment claim is literally
false, the plaintiff must show either: 1) the defendant’s test or study was not
sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that it
establishes the proposition for which it was cited, or 2) that the test, while sufficiently
reliable, does not establish the proposition claimed in defendant’s advertising.85 For
instance, in Osmose Inc v. Viance LLC,86 the Eleventh Circuit classified a claim as an
establishment claim when the defendant, a wood preservative company, had an
advertisement that raised concerns about the safety and efficacy of a competitor’s
wood preservative product. The defendant’s claims were based on test results that

78.

Id.
789 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2015).
80.
Id. at 498. The plaintiff argued that advertisement’s audience “would have recognized these references
‘as readily as if [they] had been explicitly stated’ and that the advertisement’s reference to their product was
“unmistakable” when viewed in the “broader context in which consumers would have understood it.” Id. at 502.
81.
Id. at 499.
82.
Id. at 503.
83.
The court explained that the plaintiff’s argument was confounding and that for the argument to be
plausible, one would have to follow their “winding inquiry far outside the face of the advertisement, which the
concept of literal falsity by necessary implication does not allow the court to do Id. at 502. The court noted that
the greater the degree to which a message relies upon the viewer to “integrate” its components to draw the asserted
conclusion, the less likely it is that a court will find literal falsity. Id. (quoting United States v. Clorox Co., 140
F.3d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998)).
84.
BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1994).
85.
Castrol Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d. Cir. 1992). In assessing whether a study or test
is reliable, “the fact-finder’s judgment should consider all relevant circumstances, including the state of the testing
art, the existence and feasibility of superior procedures, the objectivity and skill of the person conducting the tests,
the accuracy of their reports, and the results of other pertinent tests.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. ChesebroughPond’s Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984).
86.
612 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). The court noted that the “advertising statements were “tests prove” or
“establishment” claims. Id. at 1310.
79.
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they obtained from a third party.87 The court upheld the district court’s ruling88 and
noted that the plaintiff only needed to show that the tests the defendant mentioned
in its advertisements did not support the conclusions the defendant drew in regards
to the safety and efficacy of the product.89 Also, the Ninth Circuit has analyzed
establishment claims, finding that a plaintiff “must demonstrate that such tests are
not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that they
established’ the claim made.”90 The court held that a plaintiff could meet this burden
“either by attacking the validity of the defendant’s tests directly or by showing that
the defendant’s tests are contradicted or unsupported by other scientific tests.”91
Thus, a plaintiff can show that an establishment claims is literally false by focusing
on the defendant’s inaccurate use of testing, not the overall inaccuracy of the
advertisement.92 The plaintiff has two choices: 1) prove that the cited tests does not
establish the claimed proposition or 2) show that the defendant did not actually
conduct the cited tests.93
c. Non-establishment Claims
When an advertisement does not explicitly or implicitly state that a specific claim is
based on testing or reports, the plaintiff must prove that the advertisement is false.94
For example, in C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P.95, the
Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s claim, which challenged the defendant’s
testing and advertising of its product as a better cleanser than plaintiff’s, was not an
establishment claim because the plaintiff did not expressly contest defendant’s use of
testing and there was no language in the text implying a test.96 Thus, the plaintiff had
to affirmatively prove that the defendant’s advertised claim of “comparative
superiority” was literally false. 97 Additionally, the Eight Circuit further clarified how

87.
Id. at 1305–06. The advertisements stated that the test results uncovered that the plaintiff’s wood product
failed to prevent wood decay and that it actually accelerated the decay, which was a consumer safety issue. Id. at
1306.
88.
The district court ruled that the plaintiff’s false advertising claim was an establishment claim and that
the defendant’s advertisement was literally false. Id. at 1306–07.
89.
Id. at 1310.
90.
Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997)
91.
Id.
92.
Osmose Inc v. Viance LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011).
93.
BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994).
94.
Id. Non-establishment claims must be proven false by affirmative evidence of falsity. Id. The Fourth
Circuit stated that a non-establishment claim may be more difficult than merely proving that a test asserted to
validate the claim is not sufficiently reliable to do so. C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,
L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 1997).
95.
131 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 1997).
96.
Id. at 436.
97.
Id. at 435.
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to prove that a non-establishment claim is literally false. In Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharma., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.,98 the court noted that when a false
advertising claim states that “my product is better than yours, the Lanham Act
plaintiff must show that the defendant’s claim of superiority is false.99 However, when
the advertising states “tests prove that my product is better than yours,” the plaintiff
only has to prove the tests used are unreliable.100
3. Proving Misleading Statements
Even if an advertisement is not literally false, a plaintiff can still show that an
advertisement misled or deceived consumers. In order to prove that an advertisement
is misleading,
the courts favor testing by consumer reaction surveys, but have also found
falsity based on their own independent reaction and the reaction of witnesses
testifying before the court, including testimony based on test results, consumer
surveys, complaints received, allegations of more than a few instances or
misrepresentation, and otherwise.101
Thus, a false advertisement does not have to be literally false for a plaintiff to get relief,
as the courts want to prevent “clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and
ambiguous suggestions”102 from being shielded by advertising law.103
III. THE COURT’S REASONING

In Brown v. GNC Corp.,104 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. The Court found that although the lower court’s test was incorrect in its
specific formulation, it was correct in analyzing the law of false advertising.105 The
Court ruled that, “in order to state a false advertising claim on a theory that
representations have been proven to be false, a plaintiff must allege that all reasonable
experts in the field agree that the representations are false.”106 If a plaintiff cannot do

98.

93 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 514–15.
100.
Id.
101.
Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999).
102.
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978)
103.
Id.
104.
Brown, 789 F.3d at 509.
105.
Id. at 513-14. The district court held that “[i]f there are experts who support what [the Companies] say
in their advertisements, the advertisements are not false and misleading, but the Fourth Circuit found that the
district court incorrectly referenced Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 514 n.7.
106.
Id. at 516.
99.
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this because the scientific evidence is equivocal, then he or she has “failed to plead
that the representations based on this scientific evidence are false.” 107
The Court first differentiated between false and misleading representation.108
While the Court acknowledged that every state applies its own tests for determining
whether advertising statements are misleading, it reasoned that statements that are
literally false are also necessarily misleading.109 The Court stated that since the
plaintiffs argued that the advertisements were literally false rather than true but
misleading, the Court should only focus on whether the representations are false.110
The plaintiff’s complaint specifically stated that “the vast weight of competent clinical
evidence, and the overwhelming weight of high quality, credible and reliable studies”
supported that the advertisements were false.111 Thus, the Court reasoned that by not
pleading that all scientists agreed that glucosamine and chondroitin were ineffective,
the plaintiffs conceded that some scientific experts could agree that glucosamine and
chondroitin are effective.112 Moreover, the Court stated that the plaintiffs could not
concede that some reasonable and duly qualified scientific experts agree with a
scientific proposition while simultaneously arguing that the statement is also literally
false.113 The Court explained that the experts supporting the companies are either
unqualified or that they reflect a reasonable difference of scientific opinion.114 Thus,
according to the Court, if there is a reasonable difference of opinion, then the
challenged representation cannot be literally false.115
Although the plaintiffs argued that the Court should not resolve a battle of the
experts based solely on the pleadings, the Court found it did not need to resolve any
battle of the experts in order to determine whether the complaint stated a claim for
false advertising.116 Moreover, the court noted that by characterizing the issue as a
battle of the experts the plaintiffs further highlighted that some scientists do believe
that the glucosamine and chondroitin were effective.117 The Court further rejected the
plaintiff’s contention that the holding would create a loophole for manufacturers to
find any expert in order to immunize the company from consumer fraud action.118

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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IV. ANALYSIS
119

In Brown v. GNC Corp., the Court held that in order to survive a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff in a false advertising claim suit must allege that all reasonable experts in
the field agree that the representations are false.120 In reaching this holding, the Court
unfairly heightened the literal falsity standard of a false advertising claim and
diverged from its sister circuit’s findings.121 This decision has ultimately created an
anti-consumer precedent for false advertising claims.
By requiring plaintiffs to allege all reasonable experts must agree on a certain
claim,122 the Court has set a dangerous precedent, potentially allowing manufacturers
to automatically win in false advertising claims. Before this decision, the Fourth
Circuit allowed for discrepancies between experts in the field.123
In PBM, the Court affirmed the district court’s order permitting the expert
testimony of two experts who conducted a consumer survey and found that the
defendant’s advertisement was misleading.124 Although the defendant objected to the
use of the experts, the Court determined that the technicalities of the surveys went to
the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility.125 Moreover, the Court stated
that the methods used by the experts were of the type considered by experts in their
field.”126 Nowhere in the PBM court’s decision did it specifically mention that all
experts in the field had to believe or rely on the methods used at trial. Rather, the
court used the word experts, which suggests that some experts in the field had to agree
with the methods of the survey.
Additionally, the Court has also cited to Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit decisions
that support the conclusion that ambiguity in experts is permissible and is for the
trier of fact.127 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has also stated that expert testimony
must adhere to the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 by being both relevant and
reliable.128 Thus, when the Fourth Circuit ruled that at the pleading stage all experts
had to believe that a statement was false, the Court moved from the role of an effective
gatekeeper to an overbearing decision-maker. With this new standard, the Court is
effectively stating that although an expert testimony may be reliable and may be

119.

789 F. 3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 515.
121.
See infra Part IV.
122.
Id.
123.
PBM, 639 F.3d 111.
124.
Id. at 118.
125.
Id. at 124.
126.
Id. (emphasis added).
127.
See, e.g., Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2004), Eastman
Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 2014). Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d
1252, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2001).
128.
See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 134 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008).
120.
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relevant to proving a literally false advertisement, it still needs to pass an additional
consensus by all experts before it even gets to trial.
Section 43 of the Lanham Act was intended to address consumer deception;129
thus, the Court should not have focused mainly on whether “reasonable experts”
disagree or agree on the literal falsity of an advertising claim. While experts are critical
in determining whether consumers are deceived, the emphasis should be on the
consumers that are being deceived and the business competitors that are being
harmed. While experts can help the factfinder decide whether or not a claim is false,
a consensus amongst all experts should not be required at the initial motion to
dismiss stage. By ruling that all reasonable experts have to agree on whether or not a
statement is false,130 the Fourth Circuit is removing the fact-finding power from the
jury and putting it into the hands of the judge.
The Fourth Circuit uses a Third Circuit case to further emphasize its ruling that
all reasonable experts must agree in a literal falsity claim.131 In Castrol Inc. v.
Pennzoil,132 the Third Circuit emphasized that the test for literal falsity is whether or
not the claim is false; if a defendant’s claim is untrue, then it must be deemed literally
false.133 The majority further states that
[t]he dissent asserts, however, that a defendant need only establish
a reasonable basis to support its claims to render the advertisement
literally true. We disagree. Rather, the test for literal falsity is simpler;
if a defendant’s claim is untrue, it must be deemed literally false.134
The majority’s statement thus emphasizes that the literal falsity test is meant to be a
simple test; thus, while the Fourth Circuit uses this case to explain literal falsity, it
neglected to mention that the decision also noted that the literal falsity is not meant
to be a complicated standard at the pleading stage.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has also relied on the Pennzoil decision in another
literal falsity case, Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Indus. of Am.135 The Design
Resources court also chose to apply the literal falsity standard simply and stated that
“[a] claim of literal falsity by necessary implication could stand where the contested
conclusion necessarily flowed from the ad’s statements.”136 Thus, based on the Fourth

129.
130.
131.
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133.
134.
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Circuit jurisprudence mentioned previously in this section, it is apparent that the
Fourth Circuit has heightened its standard for literal falsity claims.137
By stating that all reasonable experts have to agree that a statement is false, the
Court also fails to acknowledge that some expert testimony is not always correct.138
Thus, the Court undermines the fact-finding process and disregards the notion that
a statement can be false even though a speaker believes that the statement is true.
Moreover, “a factual dispute is best settled by a battle of the experts before the fact
finder, not by judicial fiat”139 and that “where two credible experts disagree, it is the
job of the fact finder, not the trial court, to determine which source is more credible
and reliable.”140 Thus, since literal falsity is a question of fact, the fact finder should
determine whether the advertising claim is literally false, and not the judge. This
means that the question regarding the unanimity of scientific studies should not be
required in order to survive a motion to dismiss, because it effectively makes the
judge a fact-finder and not a gatekeeper in literally false advertising claims. This
effectively makes it easier for defendant-companies to deceive and mislead
consumers, because plaintiffs will have to make sure that all reasonable experts in a
particular field agree before they even have a chance to prove their case at trial or they
must forego their literal falsity claim.
In Waldrep Bros. Beauty Supply, Inc v. Wynn Beauty Supply Co.141, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[…] business conduct that seeks to . . . gain an
advantage in the market is not [justified].”142 The Court stressed the importance of
consumer welfare as a guide for how businesses conduct themselves.143 The Waldrep
Court is an example of how legitimate business activity must be balanced with the
protection of consumers. In the present case, the Court failed to balance the welfare
of consumers and focused solely on the business activity of Rite Aid and GNC. The
well-being of consumers has not previously been put secondary to business activity,
but the Fourth Circuit’s ruling threatens the very existence and balance of consumer
protection laws.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s decision poses a substantial threat to consumer
welfare. Scholars consider advertisements as helpful to consumers because
advertisements are informational, lower consumer search costs, which then results in

137.

See supra Part IV.
Albert S. Osborn MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY: Reasons
and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, 490 (West 2006). See also, Brief for of Law Professors as Amici Curiae for
Plaintiff-Appellants’ Petition 6, Brown v. GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
139.
City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014); See also United States v.
Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006).
140.
Id.
141.
992 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1993).
142.
Id. at 63.
143.
Id.
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competition in the markets.144 However, with false advertising, the benefits of
advertising goals are diminished. Instead of seeking to inform consumers, false
advertising promotes a culture of beguilement and dishonesty. Consumers often rely
on advertisements for entertainment, services, and to seek out information before
purchasing a product.145 In the context of advertisements concerning medicine,
consumers heavily rely on the statements of manufacturers. Due to the sensitive
nature of medicinal advertisements, and particularly in this instance, false
advertising claims deserve a higher standard than what the Fourth Circuit decided.
Because of the level of scientific inquiry that often involves medicines and
supplements, like the ones at issue, the Court reduces consumer welfare to a mere
procedural issue and engages in the technicalities of all experts vs. some experts. This
damage to consumer welfare stands in stark contrast to this Court’s stance on
protecting consumer.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit should not have set a new standard for literal falsity by claiming
that all reasonable experts in the field had to agree that a representation was false.146
The Court’s ruling has vast implications because it presents an unfairly higher
standard for plaintiffs to actually rely on the unanimity of experts in a particular
field.147 Thus, instead of leaving the issue of whether an advertisement is literally false
in the hands of the trier of fact, the decision is now left to the judge.148 This standard
undermines and leaves the very people that false advertising claims were meant to
protect –consumers– behind.149
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Lilian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle
in the Law of Deception. 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992).
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